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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CONTEXTUALIZING AND STRENGTHENING STATE MEDICAL
BOARD RESPONSES TO PHYSICIAN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
PATRICIA A. KING,* EMILY GERARD,** MARK STAZ***
& ERIC M. FISH****
ABSTRACT
As the instrument through which states regulate the professional conduct of
medical practitioners, state medical boards play a critical role in addressing
physician sexual misconduct. Sexual misconduct in the medical profession is
particularly troubling given that physicians are often privy to the most intimate
aspects of their patients’ lives. Patients place a profound trust in their physician,
and the resulting relational dynamic may impact how a patient perceives or
reacts to a physician’s conduct. State medical boards are often criticized for
failing to respond appropriately to instances of sexual misconduct. However,
some of these criticisms fail to consider historical attempts by these boards to
address this issue; they particularly fail to recognize that medical boards are
just as proactive as other professional organizations in addressing and
sanctioning sexual misconduct. Criticisms also fail to fully appreciate the impact
of the complaint-based structure of state medical regulatory law, the lack of
information sharing between other stakeholders in health care and state medical
boards, and structural and legal constraints that impact the ability of state
boards to investigate accusations of misconduct and discipline licensees
accordingly. In sum, most critiques of state board actions in legal literature fail
to properly contextualize state board responses and thus present solutions that
miss the mark. The purpose of this paper is to contextualize the responses of
state medical boards and highlight the efforts that have already been made by
individual medical boards and the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB)
to address sexual misconduct. Particular focus will be given to the FSMB’s
Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct and the 2020 FSMB Report on
Physician Sexual Misconduct (FSMB Report). The FSMB Report illustrates the
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barriers that prevent medical boards from responding more robustly to reports
of sexual misconduct. It also provides recommendations in furtherance of the
FSMB’s effort to improve identification of improper physician behaviors. The
proactive efforts of the FSMB to address sexual misconduct serve as a critical
foundation for more expansive collaborative efforts across health care to
eradicate sexual harassment, abuse, and other forms of misconduct.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At the outset of their careers, most physicians recite a version of the
Hippocratic Oath in front of their friends, family, and peers, 1 pledging “to
dedicate [their lives] to the service of humanity” and promising to “practi[c]e
[their] profession with conscience and dignity.” 2 Most practitioners live up to
these goals, continuing to practice even amid harrowing circumstances and
burnout. 3 But there are some physicians who abuse the trust placed in them,
utilizing their knowledge and situational power to exploit patients for financial
gain, sexual gratification, or other self-interested purposes. 4 In the United States,
state medical and osteopathic boards (hereinafter “medical boards” or “boards”)
are the regulatory bodies tasked with implementing state police powers by
licensing and disciplining physicians. 5 As such, each state board plays a crucial
role in addressing physician misconduct.
Sexual misconduct in medicine has proved intractable throughout history
and across continents, but the full scope of the sexual misconduct problem in
contemporary medical practice came to light at the end of the twentieth century
amid a broader cultural shift in sexual ethics. 6 Medical boards in the United
States, like their international equivalents in countries such as Canada, 7 Great
Britain, 8 New Zealand, 9 and Australia, 10 have made incremental improvements
but have at times struggled to address this issue.
1. S.J. Huber, The White Coat Ceremony: A Contemporary Medical Ritual, 29 J. MED.
ETHICS 364, 364 (2003).
2. Ramin Walter Parsa-Parsi, The Revised Declaration of Geneva: A Modern-Day
Physician’s Pledge, 318 JAMA 1971, 1971 (2017).
3. Pamela Hartzband & Jerome Groopman, Physician Burnout, Interrupted, 382 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 2485, 2486 (2020); AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RSCH. AND QUALITY, PHYSICIAN
BURNOUT (2017), https://www.ahrq.gov/prevention/clinician/ahrq-works/burnout/index.html (last
visited Oct. 30, 2021).
4. Patricia A. King et al., State Medical Board Recommendations for Stronger Approaches
to Sexual Misconduct by Physicians, 325 JAMA 1609, 1609 (2021).
5. Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical Discipline, 13
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y. 285, 286, 289, 295 (2010) (“As an extension of the state’s police
power, the medical board’s disciplinary authority is aimed at protecting medical consumers from
the harms they may incur at the hands of incompetent or dishonest physicians.”).
6. See infra Section I.A (describing the evolving cultural awareness of the prevalence and
harm caused by sexual misconduct that began concurrent with the sexual revolution in the 1970s).
7. Sanda Rodgers, Health Care Providers and Sexual Assault: Feminist Law Reform?, 8
CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 159, 159 (1995) (“This paper considers the response of Canadian courts to
allegations of sexual assault by health care providers.”).
8. Nigel Fisher & Thomas Fahy, Sexual Relationships Between Doctors and Patients, 83 J.
ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 681, 681 (1990).
9. Katherine H. Hall, Sexualization of the Doctor–Patient Relationship: Is It Ever Ethically
Permissible?, 18 FAM. PRAC. 511, 511 (2001).
10. Cherrie Ann Galletly, Sexual Misconduct by Doctors: A Problem That Has Not Gone
Away, 213 MED. J. AUSTL. 216, 216 (2020).
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In response to the pervasive sexual misconduct problem, the national
membership organization of medical boards, the Federation of State Medical
Boards (FSMB) convened a Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct
(hereinafter the “Workgroup”) in 2017 to help medical boards in the United
States lay the groundwork for accountability frameworks and address this
critical problem. 11 The FSMB does not itself have the power to sanction
physicians for misconduct—and as quasi-government entities, medical boards
are bound by state law and constitutional due process requirements. The law
does not always reflect and keep pace with professional ethical standards, 12 so
despite the official policies of regulatory and professional bodies, medical
boards must navigate the complex interplay between professional ethics and
state law. In addition to these legal constraints, medical boards have limited
resources 13 and are subject to statutory limitations on public disclosure of
internal proceedings, even though this may give a public appearance of
inaction. 14 Medical boards also face political pressures and have in some
instances been bullied into silence by more powerful political actors. 15 When
evaluating the responses of medical boards to incidences of sexual misconduct,
it is critical to examine all these factors and to consider the ways in which other
health care industry stakeholders—physicians, health systems, and government
agencies—can work alongside medical boards to implement trustworthy and
robust accountability frameworks. Understanding the context and the role of
stakeholders is critical for the success of such well-intentioned objectives.
To provide this context, Part II of this Article provides a historical
examination of physician sexual misconduct, highlights early medical board
efforts to address this problem, and outlines contemporary critiques of board
actions which led to the FSMB convening the Workgroup. Part III summarizes
11. Fed’n of State Med. Bds., Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on
Physician Sexual Misconduct, J. MED. REGUL., July 2020, at 17, 17.
12. Code of Medical Ethics Preface & Preamble, AMA, https://www.ama-assn.org/about/
publications-newsletters/code-medical-ethics-preface-preamble (last visited Oct. 30, 2021) (“The
relationship between ethics and law is complex. Ethical values and legal principles are usually
closely related, but ethical responsibilities usually exceed legal duties. Conduct that is legally
permissible may be ethically unacceptable. Conversely, the fact that a physician who has been
charged with allegedly illegal conduct has been acquitted or exonerated in criminal or civil
proceedings does not necessarily mean that the physician acted ethically.”).
13. Susan A. Chesteen & Joan M. Lally, Physician Licensing Boards: Saints or Sinners in the
Public Eye?, 15 BUS. F., no. 4, 1991, at 36, 36–37 (“One of the problems directly related to state
administration is that while the [medical board] may be willing to actively pursue its mission, state
government may refuse to adequately fund the board enough for it to be effective. In Wisconsin,
for example, the Medical Licensing Board recently requested re-licensure fees be increased to fund
the hiring of more investigators. The legislature refused.”).
14. See infra Part III (discussing the financial, statutory, and structural challenges to medical
board action).
15. Id.
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the product of the Workgroup—the 2020 FSMB Report on Physician Sexual
Misconduct (hereinafter “FSMB Report” or “Report”)—which was thereafter
unanimously adopted as policy by the FSMB’s House of Delegates, the
organization’s official policy-making body. 16 Part IV outlines persistent barriers
to systemic change and discusses methods of addressing these barriers. Finally,
Part V highlights the notable successes of several medical boards and discusses
innovative solutions that may help all boards implement the key principles of
the FSMB Report.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AND MEDICAL
REGULATION
While critical assessment of the ways in which medical boards have
addressed the physician misconduct problem is warranted, the role of medical
boards cannot be abstracted from the historical treatment of sexual misconduct
in the United States or the statutory constraints that contemporary medical
boards face, nor can the role of medical boards be abstracted from the duties of
other institutional stakeholders to identify and report physician sexual
misconduct. The public is right to demand better solutions to physician sexual
misconduct—understanding the context in which medical boards operate allows
outside commentators and medical boards themselves the opportunity to craft
tailored recommendations. Instead of solving the surface-level problems that
contribute to sexual misconduct, they can address its systemic roots and thereby
engage in more informed strategic decision-making. In turn, this will strengthen
physician accountability and help create a safer, more equitable, and just health
care system.
A.

A Historical View of Physician Sexual Misconduct

Sexual contact arising out of a physician-patient relationship has long been
considered ethically forbidden, 17 but evolving social mores in the 1970s brought
this issue out into the open. 18 Roy v. Hartogs—a case in which a female patient

16. Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct,
supra note 11.
17. Tanya J. Dobash, Physician-Patient Sexual Contact: The Battle Between the State and the
Medical Profession, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1725, 1725 (1993); see Huber, supra note 1.
18. Seymour L. Zelen, Sexualization of Therapeutic Relationships: The Dual Vulnerability of
Patient and Therapist, 22 PSYCHOTHERAPY 178, 178 (1985) (“Sexual intimacies with patients have
become open problems for the therapeutic professions. Feminism, consumerism, and a humanistic
egalitarian therapeutic orientation have all contributed to the present acute awareness of the
problem.”); see also Jacob M. Appel, Ethics Consult: Report Alleged Improper Doctor-Patient
Relationship? MD/JD Weighs In, MEDPAGE TODAY (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.medpagetoday
.com/opinion/ethics-consult/90945 (“Rules governing psychiatrist-patient sex were far more fluid
until the 1970s. Many prominent figures in the psychiatric field, including Carl Jung and Bruno
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successfully brought a malpractice claim against her psychiatrist for engaging
her in a sexual relationship—was a tipping point. 19 This case gripped the
nation’s attention and the story was adapted into print and film iterations. 20
Following these revelations, the American Psychological Association became
the first major American medical organization to explicitly prohibit any
physician-patient sexual contact as part of its ethical code. 21 The breadth and
scope of the problem became even clearer when the first prevalence studies
released in 1979 revealed that twelve percent of male psychiatrists and three
percent of female psychiatrists reported having a sexually intimate relationship
with a patient or former patient. 22
The public and academic focus largely remained on psychiatry until reports
emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s that similar problems existed in other
medical specialties such as family medicine, obstetrics, and internal medicine. 23
Studies conducted during the 1980s and 1990s revealed that a substantial
minority of physicians in different practice areas did not believe all sexual
contact between physicians and their patients to be unethical 24 and indicated that
sexual relationships between physicians and patients were widespread. 25
Articles in medical journals reveal that there was continued debate on the
boundaries of sexual misconduct—and what qualified as misconduct—with
articles asking questions such as “Sexualization of the Doctor-Patient
Relationship: Is It Ever Ethically Permissible?” 26 and “Sexual Intimacies With
Bettelheim, are alleged to have had affairs with their patients; a 1972 study found that 10% of Los
Angeles psychiatrists admitted to sexual relations with individuals under their care.”).
19. Roy v. Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 587 (N.Y. App. Term 1976); see also Linda Jorgenson
et al., The Furor Over Psychotherapist-Patient Sexual Contact: New Solutions to an Old Problem,
32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645, 652 (1991); see Dobash, supra note 17, at 1751.
20. Zelen, supra note 18.
21. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS: WITH ANNOTATIONS
ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY 1, 4 (2013 ed.).
22. Kenneth S. Pope & Valerie A. Vetter, Prior Therapist-Patient Sexual Involvement Among
Patients Seen by Psychologists, 28 PSYCHOTHERAPY 429, 429 (1991) (“The two earliest national
prevalence studies based on anonymous surveys of psychologists (Holroyd & Brodsky, 1977; Pope,
Levenson & Schover, 1979) suggest that perhaps as many as 12% of male therapists and 3% of
female therapists engaged in sexual intimacies with at least one patient[.]”).
23. H. Russell Searight & David C. Campbell, Physician-Patient Sexual Contact: Ethical and
Legal Issues and Clinical Guidelines, 36 J. FAM. PRAC. 647, 647–48 (1993) (“In the past 10 years,
sexual relationships between mental health professionals and their patients have been the focus of
considerable legal and ethical attention. However, this issue has only begun to be addressed among
nonpsychiatric physicians.”).
24. Fisher & Fahy, supra note 8.
25. See Kenneth S. Pope, How Clients Are Harmed by Sexual Contact with Mental Health
Professionals: The Syndrome and Its Prevalence, 67 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 222, 222–23 tbl.1
(1988) (summarizing results in a chart of eight surveys of mental health professionals conducted
between 1973 and 1987).
26. Hall, supra note 9, at 511–12.
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Clients After Termination: Should a Prohibition Be Explicit?” 27 Given the
continued development of sexual ethics in the twenty-first century, wholesale
condemnation of physician-patient sexual contact in all medical specialties
might seem like a foregone conclusion, but these conclusions were not entirely
unanimous, even throughout the early 2000s. 28
A review of legal literature from this era shows that courts, legal scholars,
and regulatory bodies also struggled to define the scope of sexual misconduct
and to fit this ethical violation into extant legal doctrine. 29 Sexual misconduct is
an ethical violation, and while ethics inform the law, the two are not always in
sync. 30 Courts differed in the way they construed a physician’s fiduciary duty to
patients, with some courts finding that “a physician who induces sexual relations
with a patient is liable for professional negligence only if the sexual affair was
misrepresented as part of the treatment.” 31 Outcomes like this created a murky
line between sexual misconduct and consent; despite the widespread cultural and
professional condemnation of sexual misconduct, proving sexual misconduct
had occurred and holding doctors legally accountable for their actions remained
difficult. Many victims of physician sexual predation were still left with limited
legal recourse against their abusers.
Over time, most legislators, scholars, and regulatory bodies concluded that
given the inherent power imbalance in the patient-physician relationship and the
possibility of transference, 32 there are virtually no instances in which sexual

27. Melba J.T. Vasquez, Sexual Intimacies with Clients After Termination: Should a
Prohibition Be Explicit?, 1 ETHICS & BEHAV. 45, 45–47 (1991).
28. Hall, supra note 9, at 511, 514–15 (“[T]he ethics of such a relationship between a doctor
and former patient is more debatable . . . the argument is made here that such relationships are
almost always unethical due to the persistence of transference[.]”).
29. Scott M. Puglise, “Calling Dr. Love”: The Physician-Patient Sexual Relationship as
Grounds for Medical Malpractice – Society Pays While the Doctor and Patient Play, 14 J.L. &
HEALTH 321, 322, 346 (2000) (“This note examines ‘consensual’ sexual relationships between nonmental health physicians and patients. More specifically, it examines whether such relationships
ever amount to medical malpractice.”).
30. Code of Medical Ethics Preface & Preamble, supra note 12 (discussing the AMA’s
statement on the complex interplay between the law and ethics, noting that what is unethical is not
always illegal).
31. 3 BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 24:26 (2d ed.,
June 2021 update) (“[T]here is also authority that a doctor’s duty to refrain from sexual misconduct,
a separate intentional act, does not give rise to a medical malpractice action, although other
potential causes of action might exist.”); Am. Health Laws. Ass’n, Casenotes: Malpractice:
Physician’s Sexual Misconduct Constitutes Malpractice Only if Represented as Part of Treatment,
20 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCIS. L. 210, 210 (1987).
32. Denise LeBoeuf, Psychiatric Malpractice: Exploitation of Women Patients, 11 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 83, 97 (1988) (“Transference is a theoretical construct which purports to explain the
‘transfer’ of the patient’s emotions onto her therapist, and which is held to be a necessary stage in
therapy.”).
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contact with a current or former patient is ever permissible. 33 The American
Medical Association (AMA) first explicitly condemned physician sexual
misconduct in 1991, and then expanded and clarified the scope of misconduct in
2015. 34
Calls for medical boards to strengthen responses to sexual misconduct date
to the early 1990s, when medical boards faced criticism for “lack[ing] the ability
. . . to maintain high ethical standards in the medical profession” and “handling
sexual abuse cases ‘inconsistently[.]’” 35 While these critiques were valid, they
failed to both critically examine the reasons behind medical boards’
inconsistencies and to view medical boards’ failures in their historical context.
Critiques of medical boards for failing to hold physicians accountable to modern
professional standards emerged concurrent to the development of the standards
themselves.
However, board responses to sexual misconduct kept pace with those of
other professional organizations. While many point to medical boards’ silence
in the face of physician misconduct and cast low rates of disciplinary action as
clear “failures to act,” when viewed in light of the broader professional
disciplinary culture, “[t]he rate at which medical professionals face serious
discipline annually is comparable to the rate of serious professional discipline in
other professions, including law. It is also comparable to the rate of felony
convictions among the American public.” 36 According to FSMB data, of the
1,018,776 physicians with active licenses in the United States, 37 3342 were
disciplined in 2020. 38 Comparatively, in the most recent report compiled by the
American Bar Association (ABA), of the 1,257,772 attorneys with active

33. Hall, supra note 9, at 511, 515.
34. RICHARD J. MCMURRAY, SEXUAL MISCONDUCT IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 165–73
(AMA House of Delegates Interim Meeting Proc., Rep. of Council on Ethical & Jud. Aff., 1990),
https://ama.nmtvault.com; Am. Med. Ass’n, The AMA Code of Medical Ethics’ Opinions on
Observing Professional Boundaries and Meeting Professional Responsibilities, 17 AMA J. ETHICS
432, 434 (2015) (expanding on its 1991 statement, where the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs released an opinion in 2015 which unequivocally stated that “[s]exual contact that occurs
concurrent with the patient-physician relationship constitutes sexual misconduct.”).
35. Andrew L. Hyams, Expert Psychiatric Evidence in Sexual Misconduct Cases Before State
Medical Boards, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 171, 174–75 (1992) (“Various theories, including inadequate
funding, outdated medical practice acts, and the organized profession’s dominance of medical
boards, have been posited to account for what is widely perceived as an unsatisfactory system of
professional discipline.”).
36. Sawicki, supra note 5, at 299.
37. Physician Licensure, FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS. (2020), https://www.fsmb.org/u.s.medical-regulatory-trends-and-actions/u.s.-medical-licensing-and-disciplinary-data/physicianlicensure.
38. Physician Discipline, FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS. (2020), https://www.fsmb.org/u.s.medical-regulatory-trends-and-actions/u.s.-medical-licensing-and-disciplinary-data/physiciandiscipline/.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2021] CONTEXTUALIZING AND STRENGTHENING STATE MEDICAL BOARD RESPONSES

159

licenses, 2872 were subject to disciplinary action by a state bar association.39
Thus, the rate at which medical boards discipline physicians with active licenses
is slightly greater than the rate at which state bar associations discipline
attorneys. This reveals that “an unmediated focus on the rate of medical
discipline alone is unlikely to tell us much about [medical] boards’ overall
effectiveness in protecting public interests.” 40 The rate of board action is
reflective of trends in broader culture and professional regulatory board actions;
the rates of discipline alone cannot be considered de facto proof of medical
boards’ failure or negligence.
B.

Early Medical Board Actions and Incremental Progress

Individual medical boards and the FSMB have, for decades, been working
to address physician sexual misconduct. 41 These efforts have kept pace with
evolving ethical standards and scholarly revelations on the scope of the sexual
misconduct problem in medicine—a narrative that is notably missing from most
critiques of current medical board responses to sexual misconduct cases.
Sexual misconduct was a regular topic of FSMB annual educational
conferences beginning in 1988, 42 and by the early 1990s, a number of medical
boards were in the process of conducting internal investigations into sexual
misconduct. 43 In 1993, the FSMB established an annual series of workshops
aimed at bringing together board attorneys, investigators, and others to promote
collaboration and develop solutions to these ethical challenges. 44 The first of
these workshops “focused on the challenges inherent to investigating quality of
care and sexual misconduct cases.” 45 In 2006, the FSMB developed a policy that
set guidelines for medical boards on how to handle physician sexual boundary
violations. To help medical boards implement these guidelines, the FSMB
39. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA PROFILE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 104 (2020).
40. Sawicki, supra note 5, at 299.
41. See supra notes 29–31; FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., CHALLENGE & CHANGE: ADAPTING
WITH INNOVATION: ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2021) (demonstrating that the FSMB and some medical
boards have sought to address this issue since the late 1980s).
42. Hyams, supra note 35, at 175, n.20; Catherine S. Leffler, Sexual Conduct Within the
Physician-Patient Relationship: A Statutory Framework for Disciplining This Breach of Fiduciary
Duty, 1 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 501, 502 (1996).
43. Leffler, supra note 42, at 502 (“This public interest has prompted fifteen states or
provinces to establish task forces to study the problem, and the Federation of State Medical boards
of the United States has acknowledged the importance of this issue by including it as a session topic
at four consecutive annual meetings.”).
44. DAVID A. JOHNSON & HUMAYUN J. CHAUDHRY, MEDICAL LICENSING AND DISCIPLINE
IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS (2012) (ebook) (The
FSMB has played a key supportive role in training state board staff on investigative methodologies,
providing policy recommendations, and creating opportunities for cross-collaboration between
individual medical boards.).
45. Id.
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hosted a five-part series of webinars on the policy and provided education on the
sexual misconduct problem. 46 In 2017, the FSMB saw the need to bring renewed
focus to medical board processes for handling physician sexual misconduct
allegations, and so a new Workgroup was convened to review and update the
2006 policy. 47 Along with this Workgroup, the FSMB hosted multiple related
sessions at the 2018 and 2019 FSMB annual meetings with a goal to educate and
hear the concerns of medical boards and receive additional input for the
Workgroup. Ultimately, the Workgroup produced the FSMB Report, discussed
at length in the second part of this Article. In September 2020, after the
Workgroup’s report was formally and unanimously adopted as FSMB policy,
the FSMB conducted a virtual educational program session on physician sexual
misconduct that reviewed and discussed the recommendations. 48 Presentations
and discussions between the FSMB and individual medical boards continue to
take place in an effort to implement the recommendations contained in the
FSMB’s policy.
Nonetheless, medical boards still face many barriers which inhibit their
ability to holistically address the sexual misconduct problem. 49 Chief among
these barriers is a dearth of misconduct reporting to medical boards. This is
particularly problematic because boards operate within a complaint-based
system and are thus often prevented by state statute from acting in the absence

46. Peter Graham & Scott C. Stacy, Boundary Violations: Why Don’t They Go Away?,
Address at the Federation of State Medical Board’s Web Series Seminar “Sexual Boundary
Violations: A National Conference for Regulatory Boards” (Jan. 5, 2006); Steven I. Altchuler,
FSMB Policy Statement re: Sexual Boundary Violations, Address at the Federation of State
Medical Board’s Web Series Seminar “Sexual Boundary Violations: A National Conference for
Regulatory Boards” (Jan. 12, 2006); Scott C. Stacy & Peter Graham, The Boundary Violation
Formula©: A New Paradigm for Understanding Boundary Violations and Their Prevention,
Address at the Federation of State Medical Board’s Web Series Seminar “Sexual Boundary
Violations: A National Conference for Regulatory Boards” (Jan. 19, 2006); Gene G. Abel,
Treatment and Rehabilitation, Address at the Federation of State Medical Board’s Web Series
Seminar “Sexual Boundary Violations: A National Conference for Regulatory Boards” (Jan. 26,
2006); Gregory E. Skipper & Gary D. Carr, Risk and Benefits of Utilizing PHPs in Boundary Cases,
Address at the Federation of State Medical Board’s Web Series Seminar “Sexual Boundary
Violations: A National Conference for Regulatory Boards” (Feb. 2, 2006); Gregory E. Skipper et
al., Faculty Panel Discussion, Address at the Federation of State Medical Board’s Web Series
Seminar “Sexual Boundary Violations: A National Conference for Regulatory Boards” (Feb. 9,
2006).
47. See Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual
Misconduct, supra note 11 (“In May of 2017, Patricia King, M.D., PhD., Chair at the time of the
Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB), created and led a Workgroup on Physician Sexual
Misconduct[.]”).
48. Patricia A. King, Physician Sexual Misconduct: New Policies and Approaches, Virtual
Educational Program Session, FSMB 2020 Annual Meeting Webinar (Sep. 10, 2020).
49. See infra Part IV (discussing in greater depth the barriers medical boards face). The
assertions in this paragraph are drawn from Part IV, unless noted otherwise.
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of this reporting. Boards contend with other statutory barriers such as stringent
due process requirements which limit disclosure, financial constraints, political
pressure, and other hurdles. Over the decades, medical boards have made
positive incremental changes in their response to sexual misconduct despite
these barriers—but as many critics note, further progress is required.
C. Contemporary Critiques of Medical Boards
In recent years, there have been several highly public reports in which
medical boards have been criticized for not taking timely steps to revoke or
suspend the licenses of physicians who were reported to have committed acts of
sexual misconduct. A cross-sectional analysis of physicians who were reported
to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) for sexual misconduct between
2003 and 2013 found that “[s]eventy percent of the physicians with a clinicalprivileges or malpractice-payment report due to sexual misconduct were not
disciplined by medical boards for this problem.” 50 In 2016 and 2018, the Atlanta
Journal-Constitution conducted an in-depth investigation on sexual misconduct
in medicine and “uncovered 450 cases of doctors who were brought before
medical regulators or courts for sexual misconduct or sex crimes . . . [and found]
[i]n nearly half of those cases . . . the doctors remain[ed] licensed to practice
medicine.” 51 The trial and conviction of Team USA Gymnastics physician Larry
Nassar also encouraged other victims of physician sexual abuse to come
forward, resulting in additional scrutiny of medical board practices. 52
The Nassar case was followed by additional high-profile cases addressing
egregious sexual abuse committed by University of Southern California
gynecologist George Tyndall 53 and Ohio State University athletic team
physician Richard Strauss, 54 the latter of which resulted in the Governor’s
Working Group on Reviewing of the Medical Board’s Handling of the
50. Azza AbuDagga et al., Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1039 U.S. Physicians Reported to
the National Practitioner Data Bank for Sexual Misconduct, 2003-2013, PLoS ONE, Feb. 3, 2016,
at 1, 1.
51. Carrie Teegardin & Danny Robbins, Still Forgiven: The #MeToo Movement and Public
Outcry over Dr. Larry Nassar’s Sex Abuse Have Not Reformed the System that Disciplines Doctors,
J.-CONST.,
https://doctors.ajc.com/still_forgiven/?ecmp=doctorssexabuse_micro
ATLANTA
site_nav (last visited Oct. 30, 2021).
52. Christine Hauser & Maggie Astor, The Larry Nassar Case: What Happened and How the
Fallout Is Spreading, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/sports/
larry-nassar-gymnastics-abuse.html.
53. Matt Hamilton & Harriet Ryan, Must Reads: How George Tyndall Went from USC
Gynecologist to the Center of LAPD’s Largest-ever Sex Abuse Investigation, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 19,
2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-george-tyndall-profile-usc-sexualassault-allegations-20181219-story.html.
54. Rick Maese, Ohio State Team Doctor Sexually Abused 177 Students over Decades, Report
Finds, WASH. POST (May 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2019/05/17/ohiostate-team-doctor-sexually-abused-students-over-decades-report-finds/.
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Investigation Involving Richard Strauss. 55 In 2018, a report from the National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine identified sexual
misconduct as being widespread in scientific communities, especially in
medicine. 56 These reports raised important issues and presented an opportunity
for medical boards to think critically about identifying, sanctioning, and alerting
the public about physician sexual misconduct.
III. THE 2020 FSMB REPORT ON PHYSICIAN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
In response to growing public awareness of physician sexual misconduct via
high-profile egregious cases of sexual misconduct and criticism of individual
board action (and inaction), the FSMB and its member boards renewed focus on
the sexual misconduct problem. The FSMB took initiative by forming a national
Workgroup that, over the course of two years, intensively studied multiple
aspects of sexual misconduct, examined critical board functions, and
continuously solicited input from multiple stakeholders in medicine, including
students, and, most importantly, survivors of physician sexual misconduct. 57
The functions and processes of medical boards that the Workgroup scrutinized
included reporting processes, investigation methodologies, procedures for data
sharing and ensuring data transparency, education, discipline, and adjudication,
among others. 58 The perspectives of stakeholders and survivors alike were
incorporated throughout the process; the results of this intensive study of the
issue were published in the FSMB Report.

55. Transparency, STATE MED. BD. OHIO, https://med.ohio.gov/Transparency (last visited
Oct. 30, 2021).
56. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN: CLIMATE,
CULTURE, AND CONSEQUENCES IN ACADEMIC SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE 62
(2018).
57. See Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual
Misconduct, supra note 11, at 17–18 (“In analyzing these issues, the Workgroup benefited
tremendously from discussions with . . . the FSMB’s partner organizations and stakeholders. . . .
The Workgroup extends its thanks, in particular, to the American Association of Colleges of
Osteopathic Medicine (AACOM), Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), Student
Osteopathic Medical Association (SOMA), Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency
(AHPRA), American Medical Association (AMA), American Medical Women’s Association
(AMWA), American Osteopathic Association (AOA), Council of Medical Specialty Societies
(CMSS), Federation of Medical Regulatory Authorities of Canada (FMRAC), Federation of State
Physician Health Programs (FSPHP), several provincial medical regulatory colleges from Canada,
subject matter experts from Justice3D, PBI Education, and additional physician experts, and
especially the victim and survivor advocates who bravely shared their experiences with Workgroup
members.”).
58. Id. at 17.
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Primary Goal and Key Principles Underlying the FSMB Report

The primary goal of the Workgroup and the FSMB Report was to provide
medical boards with best practice recommendations for effectively addressing
sexual misconduct and deterring future instances of misconduct. After forming
the Workgroup, the Chair of the FSMB charged the members of the Workgroup
with:
1) collecting and reviewing available disciplinary data, including incidence
and spectrum of severity of behaviors and sanctions, related to sexual
misconduct;
2) identifying and evaluating barriers to reporting sexual misconduct to
medical boards, including, but not limited to, the impact of state
confidentiality laws, state administrative codes and procedures,
investigative procedures, and cooperation with law enforcement on the
reporting and prosecution/adjudication of sexual misconduct;
3) evaluating the impact of medical board public outreach on reporting;
4) reviewing the FSMB’s 2006 policy statement, Addressing Sexual
Boundaries: Guidelines for State Medical Boards, and revising,
amending or replacing it, as appropriate; and
5) assessing the prevalence of sexual boundary/harassment training in
undergraduate and graduate medical education and developing
recommendations and/or resources to address gaps. 59
To carry out this charge, “the Workgroup adopted a broad lens with which to
scrutinize not only the current practices of state medical boards . . . but also
elements of professional culture . . . evolving public expectations of the medical
profession, and the impact of trauma on survivors of sexual misconduct.” 60 The
Workgroup thus identified four key principles, detailed below, providing a
critical ideological framework upon which its recommendations could be built.
1. Trust
As “[t]he physician-patient relationship is built upon trust,” 61 trust, defined
as “a confident belief on the part of the patient in the moral character and
competence of their physician,” 62 was the first key principle identified by the
group. In discussing trust, the group found physicians have a duty to safeguard
the trust that patients place in them, as a breach of this trust can have a lasting
negative impact on the patients involved and on the public. Individual physicians
who violate patient trust also undermine the trustworthiness of the medical
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 18.
62. See Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual
Misconduct, supra note 11, at 18 (detailing the foundational importance of trust in the physicianpatient relationship).
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profession. 63 Thus, the group concluded to maintain patient trust and fulfill
physicians’ general duty to advance the medical profession, physicians must act
according to underlying ethical principles.
2. Professionalism
Professional ethical principles hold physicians to a high standard of conduct
that is proportionate to the level of trust that patients place in the physician; the
Workgroup thus identified professionalism as the second key principle. 64 While
the scope of what constitutes sexual misconduct has undergone transformation
in recent decades, the avoidance of sexual relationships with patients has been
“a principle of professionalism since at least the time of Hippocrates.” 65 This
notion has been reaffirmed by recent statements on physician conduct, such as
the Declaration of Geneva and the AMA Code of Ethics. 66
3. Fairness
To effectively hold physicians accountable to these principles of
professional ethics, it is critical that the process is fair for all. The principle of
fairness—the third key principle identified by the Workgroup—applies to both
patients and physicians. 67 Individuals 68 who have been impacted by physician
sexual abuse “must be granted fair treatment throughout the regulatory process
and be afforded opportunities to seek justice for wrongful conduct committed
against them.” 69 Medical boards have a duty to protect the public from bad
actors, ensuring that all who practice as state licensed physicians are worthy of
the immense trust that patients place in them.
However, medical boards also have a duty to balance physician
accountability and public disclosure of board actions within the limitations of
63. AbuDagga et al., supra note 50, at 2, 11.
64. See Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual
Misconduct, supra note 11, at 18.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 34; WMA Declaration of Geneva, WORLD MED. ASS’N (July 9, 2018),
https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-geneva/.
67. See Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual
Misconduct, supra note 11, at 18.
68. See Key Terms and Phrases: Victim or Survivor?, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/articles/
key-terms-and-phrases (last visited Nov. 23, 2021) (“‘Should I use the term victim or survivor?’
Both terms are applicable. RAINN tends to use the term ‘victim’ when referring to someone who
has recently been affected by sexual violence; when discussing a particular crime; or when referring
to aspects of the criminal justice system. We often use ‘survivor’ to refer to someone who has gone
through the recovery process, or when discussing the short- or long-term effects of sexual
violence.” As sexual misconduct impacts not only the individual patient but others as well, this
short article highlights the importance of nomenclature when discussing this issue.).
69. See Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual
Misconduct, supra note 11, at 18.
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state law. The fairness principle also applies to physicians as they “must be
granted due process in investigative and adjudicatory processes.” 70 Furthermore,
not all forms of sexual misconduct are the same. While all constitute an ethical
violation, there is a continuum of behaviors which demand different responses;
when applied to physicians, the fairness principle also dictates that
“proportionality should be considered in disciplinary actions.” 71 Ensuring a fair
process when a patient accuses a physician of failing to adhere to the core
principle of professionalism helps to build trust in medical boards; maintaining
transparency throughout the complex decision-making and evidentiary review
processes is also critical.
4. Transparency
The final key principle identified by the Workgroup was transparency, as
transparency is important for the purposes of maintaining the public trust in the
profession itself, as well as its individual members. 72 Transparency in board
actions can be difficult at times; in some instances, boards are not able to
publicly disclose data or other information on physician misconduct due to
competing factors such as fairness to the accused, restrictions on publication of
personal or sensitive information, or stipulations between the board and the
physician. 73 This is particularly problematic when state boards are unable to
publicly respond to highly publicized misconduct. Disclosure limitations thus
contribute to the perception that medical boards turn a blind eye to physician
misconduct. As medical boards operate within a complaint-based system, they
cannot act if the public does not know—or trust—that coming to the board with
their concern will result in action. Because the continued ability of any
profession to regulate its members is contingent upon society’s approval of how
regulatory responsibilities are fulfilled, 74 the Workgroup found that medical
boards need to balance the limitations of a complaint-based system and legal
limitations on disclosure with the need for transparency.
These four principles—trust, professionalism, fairness, and transparency—
are integral to maintaining a safe, effective, and just system for all. The public
needs to trust that medical boards will adjudicate complaints about physician
misconduct fairly; that trust is built by physicians adhering to core ethical
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 19, 28 (discussing the importance of transparency for developing trust and
accountability).
73. See id. at 28 (“The ability to disclose particular details of investigative findings and
disciplinary actions is limited by state statute in many jurisdictions.”).
74. See Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual
Misconduct, supra note 11, at 28 (explaining that instances of sexual misconduct affect both
individual patients and the public at large, so effective self-regulation of the medical profession
happens through mechanisms that foster mutual trust and transparency).
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principles of the profession and by board transparency in their evaluations of
physician conduct. The Workgroup embodied these values by soliciting the
perspectives of industry stakeholders—including physician groups and
academic experts—alongside survivors of physician sexual misconduct. The
Workgroup incorporated the input of these groups throughout the entire process
of drafting and evaluating the recommendations made in the Report and placed
particular importance on the perspectives of survivors in its discussions on
trauma-informed investigations. 75
B.

The Workgroup Recommendations and A Call for Cultural Change

Along with identifying key principles, the Report sought to highlight key
issues and barriers to implementation of these best practices, among which are
elements of the current professional culture in medicine. As critical as medical
boards are in the disciplinary process, “effectively addressing physician sexual
misconduct requires widespread cultural and systemic changes that can only be
accomplished through shared efforts across the medical education and practice
continuum.” 76 However, the current medical culture often permits or enables
sexual misconduct and sexually harassing behaviors, either with colleagues,
trainees, or patients.
To support a cultural shift and to achieve clarity and consensus about the
FSMB’s recommendations, the Report provided an updated definition of sexual
misconduct. 77 Sexual misconduct was defined as occurring along a continuum
of escalating severity. 78 At one end of the continuum are less egregious forms
of sexual misconduct, often referred to as “grooming behaviors,” such as special
treatment, seemingly innocent touching, and comments that could be construed
to be romantic or inappropriately flattering. 79 Behaviors at the more severe end
of the spectrum would include overt sexual comments, gestures, acts, and
relationships, whether there is “consent” from the recipient of these behaviors
or not. 80 The rationale for defining sexual misconduct in this manner is both to
recognize that it can take many forms, and to illustrate that a pattern of seemingly
innocuous behaviors is worthy of regulatory attention because it can constitute
grooming and may escalate into more overt sexual behavior that is harmful to
patients and others.
The FSMB Report also placed a high degree of importance on
communication in the physician-patient relationship, in part through the
75. Id. at 23–24.
76. Id. at 31.
77. Id. at 19 (“For the purposes of this report, physician sexual misconduct is understood as
behavior that exploits the physician-patient relationship in a sexual way. . . .”).
78. Id.
79. Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct,
supra note 11, at 19.
80. Id.
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informed consent process, to ensure that the nature of and clinical indications
for examinations and procedures, especially intimate ones, are understood by the
patient and not misinterpreted as inappropriate. 81 This was meant to support the
professional responsibility of communication and encourage a culture of
transparency and respect for patient autonomy while safeguarding the trust that
exists between a patient and their physician. A benefit of enhanced
communication is that patients are better equipped with information about what
might constitute inappropriate behavior in other clinical encounters. Patients
may therefore recognize and be more willing to report such behavior when it
occurs.
The Report acknowledges, however, that the most significant changes in the
professional culture must be brought about by the profession itself. 82 While
medical education plays a key role in inculcating appropriate behavior through
teaching and role modeling, physicians must also learn to speak up, both through
conversations with colleagues when sexual misconduct occurs and through
formal reporting of such behaviors to employment authorities and medical
boards. To argue that a duty to report puts physicians in an awkward or unfair
position is to accept harmful and unprofessional elements of the prevailing
culture in medicine.
C. The Workgroup Recommendations
After a lengthy open consultation on a set of draft recommendations that saw
participation not only from medical boards, but also from multiple organizations
in the United States, patient advocates, survivors of sexual assault, and
regulatory authorities from around the world, the Workgroup’s efforts
culminated in the FSMB Report. 83 This Report provided thirty-eight
recommendations for medical board processes for improved public protection. 84
These recommendations focus on transparency of regulatory data and
decisions, and provide guidance for timely and sensitive approaches to
complaints and complainants. 85 Particularly, medical boards are encouraged to
incorporate trauma-informed techniques into the investigatory process and act
in a strong and decisive manner to address misconduct. 86 The guidelines also
call for improved education of the public on the role of medical boards and how
to make a complaint to a medical board.87 Emphasis on professional
responsibility and normalizing the process of speaking up address the perceived
81. Id. at 20.
82. Id. at 18.
83. Id. at 17–18.
84. Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct,
supra note 11, at 31–34.
85. Id. at 31–32.
86. Id. at 32.
87. Id. at 31–32.
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code of silence among health care professionals and within the workplace. 88
Finally, the recommendations stress the importance of education about sexual
misconduct at all stages of the educational and practice continuum. 89 The Key
Recommendations are summarized in Table 1.
TABLE 1: KEY FSMB RECOMMENDATIONS 90
Topic

Recommendation

Culture

• Promotion and support of professionalism
• Zero tolerance of sexual misconduct

Transparency

Complaints

Reporting

• Information made publicly available to justify and
provide rationale for regulatory decisions
• Clear coding of disciplinary actions, linking discipline to
behavior
• Consistent terminology for disciplinary actions across
medical boards
• Education and guidance for patients about the complaints
process
• Frequent communication with complainants throughout
the investigative process
• Prioritization of processing complaints related to sexual
misconduct
• Inclusion of specially trained patient liaisons on medical
board staff
• Stronger legislation mandating institutional and
individual reporting and ability to levy fines for not
reporting egregious conduct
• Reporting requirements for results of peer review
processes that uncover sexual misconduct

88. Id. at 31–34.
89. Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct,
supra note 11, at 31, 33–34.
90. Id. at 31–34.
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• Medical board intervention when investigation indicates
reasonable probability that sexual misconduct has
occurred
• Ability to impose interim terms or limitations, including
suspension, on a physician’s license prior to completion
of investigation
• Implementation of trauma-informed procedures when
interviewing and interacting with complainants and
adjudicating cases
• Complainant’s preference for gender of investigators
respected
• Automatic license revocation for egregious acts of a
sexual nature or repeated commission of lesser acts,
especially following remedial efforts
• Discontinuation of chaperone model for monitoring, and
implementation of “Practice Monitors,” subject to
specific conditions
• Consideration of remedial action following sexual
misconduct only under strict conditions
• Provision of education about professionalism,
professional boundaries, sexual misconduct, and the
effects of trauma at all career stages and to medical board
members and staff

IV. CHALLENGES MOVING FORWARD: BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTING CHANGE
Evaluating a board’s implementation of best-practice recommendations
such as those outlined in the FSMB Report must involve consideration of the
statutory, cultural, and structural limitations on medical board actions. As others
have acknowledged, statutory changes are in some cases needed to fully
implement best practices. 91 Implementing best practices is sometimes frustrated
by the complex interplay of law, society, and limited resources.
A.

Input Challenge: Resource Scarcity

Medical boards face a critical dearth of information that impacts their ability
to proactively address misconduct. As the current regulatory system is
complaint-based, medical boards are generally reliant upon others to provide
critical information before investigations commence. This information can be

91. See id. at 20, 32. See also Elizabeth Pendo et al., Protecting Patients from Physicians Who
Inflict Harm: New Legal Resources for State Medical Boards, 15 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 7, 14 (2022).
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provided from different sources, but often is not shared. 92 Patients, hospitals,
health systems, insurers, and practitioners themselves all play key roles in the
complaint-based disciplinary system. Whether these stakeholders remain silent
out of fear, a lack of knowledge, or out of self-interest, the impact is the same.
When stakeholders do not report misconduct to medical boards, these boards do
not receive the information that they need to initiate an investigation or meet
evidentiary requirements necessary to suspend or revoke an offending
physician’s license. As discussed in the FSMB Report, when boards publicly fail
to sanction physicians or otherwise fail to be transparent, patient trust in the
system erodes. 93 This in turn results in a vicious cycle of silence, inaction, and
potentially, further abuse.
One important source of information is the patients themselves or their
surrogates. Patients who have been harmed by a physician are often in
possession of information sufficient to trigger an investigation by a medical
board to prevent the physician from continuing to engage in harmful conduct.
However, victims of physician misconduct have low rates of reporting, with a
Harris Poll—commissioned by the FSMB—finding that only thirty-three
percent “of those who believe they experienced unethical, unprofessional, or
substandard care reported the misconduct or filed a complaint.” 94 Some
scholarly estimates are even lower, with one study estimating that fewer than
one in ten patient-victims chooses to file a report. 95
There are many factors that contribute to patients not reporting physician
abuse. Victims of sexual crimes are often hesitant to come forward, and
reporting rates for sexual crimes are low on a national level; according to the
most recent data available from the Department of Justice, only 33.9% of rape
or sexual assault victims reported the crime to police. 96 In the case of physician
misconduct, institutional mistrust, fear of retaliation, fear of social stigma,
shame, and even a lack of awareness about the role of medical boards can all
play a role in non-reporting. Of the 33% of patients who reported misconduct,
the FSMB-commissioned Harris poll found that “only 34% [of those who
reported misconduct] took their complaint to a state medical board.” 97 Patients
92. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., POSITION STATEMENT ON DUTY TO REPORT 1 (2016),
https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/policies/position-statement-on-duty-to-report.pdf.
93. Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct,
supra note 11, at 27.
94. National Survey Indicates Majority of Physician Misconduct Goes Unreported, FED’N OF
STATE MED. BDS. (May 30, 2019), https://www.fsmb.org/advocacy/news-releases/national-survey
-indicates-majority-of-physician-misconduct-goes-unreported/.
95. James M. DuBois et al., Sexual Violation of Patients by Physicians: A Mixed-Methods,
Exploratory Analysis of 101 Cases, 31 SEXUAL ABUSE 503, 504 (2019).
96. RACHEL E. MORGAN & JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., NCJ 255113, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2019 (2020).
97. National Survey Indicates Majority of Physician Misconduct Goes Unreported, supra note
94; THE HARRIS POLL, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AWARENESS STUDY (2018), https://www.fsmb
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need to know where to report and feel empowered to report; they need to be able
to trust that their report will be confidential and trust that their report could make
an impact. 98 Thus, targeted efforts to educate the public on the role that boards
play in physician discipline are essential, as are the creation of reporting systems
that are easy-to-use, accessible-to-all, and trustworthy. 99 The FSMB-conducted
Harris poll also found that about a third of patients reported the misconduct
directly to the physician’s hospital or practice. 100 This is a logical place for
patients to turn, and thus institutional stakeholders—including hospitals,
physician groups, and private clinics—and all members of the health care team
also play a critical role in providing information to medical boards. Hospitals
and other health care stakeholders have a legal and ethical duty to report, but as
the FSMB Report noted, this duty “has proven insufficient in recent years[.]” 101
A culture of silence among many medical professionals, limited incentives for
individual or institutional reporting, and weak enforcement mechanisms all
contribute to the problem. As a result, “[h]ospitals or physician employers
sometimes ignore reports of abuse or push for a resignation rather than reporting
physicians to medical boards or law enforcement.” 102
Many state statutes permit medical boards to assess fines against hospitals
that fail to report egregious conduct, but these boards are often outmatched by
the comparatively vast resources of large health systems. 103 Federal law,
specifically the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) has the effect
of disincentivizing such reporting. Congress intended that the HCQIA would
“prevent . . . injustices by making available to employers and licensure agencies
critical information about adverse actions taken against licensed health care
professionals” 104 by requiring hospitals to report actions taken against

.org/siteassets/advocacy/news-releases/2018/harris-poll-executive-summary.pdf
(study
was
prepared for the FSMB).
98. Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct,
supra note 11, at 28.
99. Id. at 33.
100. THE HARRIS POLL, supra note 97 (indicating that thirty-one percent reported the physician
to their office/hospital/group and twenty-five percent reached out to a lawyer).
101. Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct,
supra note 11, at 21.
102. DuBois et al., supra note 95.
103. Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct,
supra note 11, at 22 (“State medical boards should have the ability to levy fines against institutions
for failing to report instances of egregious conduct. While many boards already have statutory
ability to do so, they are reluctant to engage in legal proceedings with hospitals or other institutions
with far greater resources at their disposal.”).
104. RON SCOTT, PROMOTING LEGAL AND ETHICAL AWARENESS: A PRIMER FOR HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS AND PATIENTS 77 (2009).
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physicians and through the creation of a NPDB. 105 However, under the HCQIA,
hospitals are not required to report patient complaints or even allegations of
egregious misconduct; rather, they are required to report “a professional review
action that adversely affects the clinical privileges of a physician for a period
longer than 30 days.” 106 Furthermore, the HCQIA provides hospitals with
“broad-based immunity from liability for all professional review actions which
meet its standards and which are made in the conduct of professional review
activity.” 107 In other words, the HCQIA gives hospitals and health
administrators wide latitude to internally handle physician misconduct as long
as a hospital’s review process conforms to the standards set forth in the statute 108
and only requires reporting when the review results in an adverse action against
the physician. Thus, the protections afforded to the peer review process under
the HCQIA curb the flow of information from hospitals to medical boards; this
statute incentivizes hospitals to handle allegations of physician misconduct
through internal review processes, and medical boards are left without key data
that could be used in furtherance of their duty to regulate the practice of
medicine.
Individual physicians and other members of a patient’s health care team are
a critical source of information. As highlighted in the FSMB Report, there are
“highly problematic aspects of sexual misconduct in medical education and
practice, many of which permeate the prevailing culture of medicine and selfregulation.” 109 There has long been a breakdown in reporting within the health
care profession, as “[h]ealth care providers who sexually assault patients
sometimes commit the act in the presence of other medical professionals, who
may actually witness the sexual misconduct;” even those who witness this
conduct do not report, as there “seems to be a ‘code of silence’ [among] some
health care providers.” 110 A cultural shift within medicine that normalizes the
reporting of misconduct must take place. Recent FSMB recommendations thus

105. Mark A. Colantonio, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 and Its Impact
on Hospital Law, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 91, 92–93 (1988).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(1)(A).
107. Colantonio, supra note 105, at 93–94.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 11112 (“For purposes of the protection set forth in section 11111(a) of this
title, a professional review action must be taken—(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in
the furtherance of quality health care, (2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter,
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician involved or after such
other procedures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances, and (4) in the reasonable
belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain facts
and after meeting the requirement of paragraph (3).”).
109. Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct,
supra note 11, at 18.
110. Nanci Hamilton, Stopping Doctor Evil: How to Prevent the Prevalence of Health Care
Providers Sexually Abusing Sedated Patients, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 299, 306–07 (2016).
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also include strengthening accountability models for physicians and other health
care providers who fail to report sexual misconduct. 111
This necessary culture shift depends on individual action—but institutional
support from hospitals and health systems is also critical. The FSMB Report
acknowledges “physicians may also avoid reporting because of the moral
distress . . . and the impracticality of reporting where power dynamics exist and
where stakes are high for reporters.” 112 Some physicians may reasonably fear
that coming forward will result in personal or institutional retaliation.
Several recent cases illustrate the importance of hospitals reporting to
medical boards and reinforce the need to implement FSMB recommendations
for greater hospital accountability in reporting to medical boards. In July 2021,
Susan Kryhoski filed a lawsuit against New York Presbyterian Hospital, alleging
that she had been assaulted there years prior by Dr. Joseph Silverman. 113 Early
reports revealed that she was at least the second person to come forward with
these claims, yet no record of the hospital reporting to the New York State Office
of Professional Medical Conduct could be located. 114
The same pattern of institutional inaction and secrecy is also present in the
case of Dr. Ricardo Cruciani. Cruciani, a neurologist who was charged with
sexual assault and stripped of his Pennsylvania medical license following an
internal investigation at Drexel University, faces ongoing litigation with patients
he treated during his tenure at Beth Israel Medical Center in New York and
Capital Health System in New Jersey. 115 One suit alleges that Cruciani was able
to get away with his behavior because “hospital administrators and staff
members ignored reports that Mr. Cruciani was sexually assaulting patients . . .
never warning other hospitals, state authorities or the police.” 116 This claim is
substantiated by officials at Drexel University, who have publicly “pointed the
finger at other hospitals for failing to take action or to warn them [stating]
‘Drexel hired Cruciani after conducting a thorough background check . . . None
111. Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct,
supra note 11, at 23, 32 (“Physicians who fail to report known instances of sexual misconduct
should be liable for sanction by their state medical board for the breach of their professional duty
to report.”).
112. Id. at 22.
113. Kara Grant, NewYork-Presbyterian Sued for Allegedly Ignoring Child Sexual Abuse,
MEDPAGE TODAY (Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.medpagetoday.com/special-reports/exclusives
/93854.
114. Id.; Mary Murphy, Woman Sues Prominent NY Hospital; Says Anorexia Doctor Raped
Her There as a 11-Year-Old Patient, PIX 11 LOC. NEWS (July 29, 2021, 5:58 PM), https://pix11
.com/news/local-news/woman-sues-prominent-ny-hospital-says-anorexia-doctor-raped-her-thereas-11-year-old-patient/.
115. Roni Caryn Rabin, After Years of Sexual Abuse Allegations, How Did This Doctor Keep
Working?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/11/health/ricardocruciani-sexual-abuse.html.
116. Id.
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of these hospitals ever notified Drexel about Cruciani’s conduct.’” 117 These
cases are highly publicized examples but are indicative of an insidious and
widespread problem; even preeminent institutions at times shield physicians
from misconduct allegations. 118
There needs to be a pipeline of information going to medical boards so they
can effectively investigate and respond to allegations of misconduct. Obtaining
information about misconduct is critical—without information, boards have
limited ability to investigate or act. There is a need for patients and health care
providers alike to recognize the important role they play in addressing physician
sexual misconduct. To make this a possibility, medical boards must make
targeted attempts to educate patients, to provide clear, trustworthy mechanisms
that facilitate swift reporting, and to have robust enforcement mechanisms for
holding institutional actors accountable. The FSMB Report and the work of
other scholars 119 show that legislative changes on this front are warranted.
B.

The Impact of Structural Limitations, Resource Scarcity, and Statutory
Constraints on Disciplinary Efforts

Even when a medical board may be “aware” of alleged misconduct, its
ability to discipline may be limited by statute as well as requisite resources to
conduct a thorough investigation and gather evidence that would satisfy the
burden of proof required to take severe disciplinary action against a physician.
Moreover, undue political influence exerted on the board may limit its ability to
act independently in furtherance of public protection.
Generally, state medical practice acts provide boards broad powers to
investigate and discipline in the public interest, but this latitude is not inviolable
to subsequent amendment. For example, in 2015, and against the objections of
the medical board, Louisiana enacted a law that restricted the ability of the
board’s executive director from directing investigations and narrowly bound the
time in which the board could initiate and complete an investigation. 120
Additionally, some states are limited in their ability to share information about
pending investigations with other medical boards where a physician may be
licensed. In fact, one provision of the Interstate Medical Licensure Compact
allows medical boards to conduct joint investigations and share confidential
information about physicians licensed under the Compact. 121 Under some prior
117. Id.
118. Anthony T. DiPietro, The Role of Institutions in Enabling Sexual Abuse, DIPIETRO L. FIRM
(June 3, 2018), https://www.atdlaw.com/2018/06/03/the-role-of-institutions-in-enabling-sexualabuse/.
119. Pendo et al., supra note 91.
120. LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:1270(A)(9) (2007); LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285.2(A) (2015).
121. RULE ON COORDINATED INFO. SYS., JOINT INVESTIGATIONS & DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
§§ 6.4(b), (i) (INTERSTATE MED. LICENSURE COMPACT COMM’N 2018) (“Upon initiating a joint
investigation, the lead investigative Board shall notify the Interstate Commission of the joint
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state statutes, boards were prohibited from sharing confidential information,
even with other medical boards.
The nature of the appointment processes creates a structural constraint that
should be considered if one is to objectively critique board activities and
conclude a board failed to sufficiently act in the public interest. The common
refrain that regulatory boards are captured by the profession is hyperbolic and
does not accurately reflect experience on a medical board and the important role
of public members. 122 The need for independent board members is a hallmark of
FSMB policy on the structure of medical boards. 123 This policy further
recommends that at a minimum public members constitute twenty-five percent
of the number of board members. 124 Since California added the first public
member to its medical board in 1961, states have heeded the call for more diverse
representation and made changes to composition to ensure that the board reflects
the diversity of the public it is there to protect. 125
However, board appointments are subject to approval of a politically elected
individual, most often the governor. 126 And while boards operate independently
and procedures exist that shield the expert decision making of medical board
members, the nature of appointment and regulation in general make it difficult
for even the most irreproachable board member to avoid entanglement with the
political process. Boards may proceed on some disciplinary issues cautiously,
balancing the need to discipline to the full extent possible with the reality that
such action may limit the ability of the board to achieve other objectives. A
strong action against a physician with political connections may raise the ire of
an influential member of the legislature or the appointing authority itself. And
unfortunately, retribution against a medical board that acts decisively in the
public interest is more than conjecture—it is a reality board members must
confront in their decision-making process on how best to regulate in the public
interest. 127
investigation and inform the Interstate Commission which member Boards are part of the joint
investigation. The Interstate Commission shall notify any other member Boards where the Compact
physician is licensed of the identity of the individual under investigation and the contact
information for the lead investigative Board.”).
122. Stephen E. Heretick, The Role of Public Members on State Medical Boards, J. MED.
REGUL., Mar. 1, 2010, at 6, 6–9.
123. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., GUIDELINES FOR THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF A
STATE MEDICAL AND OSTEOPATHIC BOARD 14 (2021), https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy
/policies/guidelines-for-the-structure-and-function-of-a-state-medical-and-osteopathic-board.pdf.
124. Id.
125. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 676.400 (2018).
126. GUIDELINES FOR THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF A STATE MEDICAL AND
OSTEOPATHIC BOARD, supra note 123, at 16.
127. Political Ties Cited in Perry’s Intervention in Oklahoma Medical Probe, DALL. MORNING
NEWS (Nov. 4, 2015, 1:20 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2015/11/04/politicalties-cited-in-perrys-intervention-in-oklahoma-medical-probe/ (In 2010, the Oklahoma Board of
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Scarcity of board resources also factors into the approach taken to discipline.
The majority of medical boards are self-funded, meaning their budget is
contingent on funds generated by board activities and licensing fees. 128 In some
states, revenue collected from licensure fees is the only source of funds to carry
out the totality of regulatory obligations, and any punitive fees collected from
licensees for noncompliance may be subject to transfer to a state’s general funds.
Financial limitations and the costs of vigorous investigations limit effective
disciplinary enforcement by medical boards. 129 Thus, for each complaint,
investigation, and disciplinary proceeding, medical boards must consider the
impact the chosen action has on the ability of the board to reserve funds for
equally important aspects of medical regulation. 130 This impact further factors
into the decision to pursue an agreed order if facts presented in a complaint and
investigation make it difficult to ascertain whether the evidentiary threshold can
be met. 131
Together, these concepts factor into the ultimate approach a board takes
toward investigating and disciplining misconduct. While the strong call for
investigatory transparency and discipline to the full extent possible is
appreciated, it must be balanced against the primary concern of the medical
boards, which is protection of the public.
At their core, medical boards are important state-sanctioned instruments
whose task is to promote public safety by balancing risk against harms. Each
decision a board makes must take into account the “holistic view of regulation
and risk management[] and conceptualize[] risks as interrelated and as having
potential consequences for broader social, economic and political
environments.” 132 Any decision that a state board makes in the process of
handling a case in which a physician is accused of misconduct reverberates far
beyond the individuals involved in that particular case. This may mean that in
certain circumstances, boards may opt for an action with greatest immediate
impact, such as using an Agreed Order, in order to restrict a physician’s ability
Medical Examiners investigated a physician accused of serious violations involving over twenty
patients, which included billing fraud, paralysis, and even death. As the investigations continued,
the governor inserted herself into the board’s investigation and adjudication of the matter,
presumably after being urged to do so by another governor, who just so happened to be the recipient
of campaign donations from the physician in question. Ultimately, the board refused to accede to
governor’s request, creating tensions that impacted the Board’s independence to regulate in the
public interest.).
128. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS 59–60
(2018), https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/publications/us-medical-regulatory-trendsactions.pdf.
129. Id.; Sawicki, supra note 5, at 315.
130. Sawicki, supra note 5, at 301, 315.
131. Id.
132. Bridget M. Hutter, A Risk Regulation Perspective on Regulatory Excellence, in
ACHIEVING REGULATORY EXCELLENCE 101, 106 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2017).
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to provide care in lieu of a full investigation. 133 For example, a board may decide
to enter an Agreed Order with a physician, even though the board suspects that
the Agreed Order may not provide a full and complete account of the facts
underlying the decision per the terms of the agreement. In that instance, the
terms of the Agreed Order may be, in the board’s estimation, the most efficient
way of managing the societal risk presented by the physician.
Fully informed future recommendations and effective changes to the
processes designed to address physician misconduct can only be realized
alongside an understanding of the need for boards to manage risk, the statutory
limitations placed on actions and disclosures, an awareness that boards often
lack critical resources (like the information necessary to initiate investigations),
and an acknowledgment of some boards’ inability to hold other stakeholders
accountable for failing to report misconduct.
V. STATE MEDICAL BOARD SUCCESSES: HOPE FOR THE FUTURE
While boards must grapple with these barriers, there are innovative ways in
which they can work to improve the status quo—including and in addition to
adopting the recommendations contained in the FSMB Report. Medical boards
can use emerging technologies to implement better systems for identifying
physicians whose records contain “red flags.” In this way, physicians, especially
those who are guilty of serial abuse, would be less able to fly under the radar
and avoid accountability. One of the key issues with physician accountability is
identifying those who are or who could become serial offenders. A recent study
of over 90,000 physician records in the state of Illinois found that physicians
with two or more disciplinary actions account for only 0.47% percent of
physicians, but 28% of all disciplinary actions; similarly, the study found that
physicians with two or more paid medical malpractice claims account for 2.37%
of all licensed physicians, but 53% of paid claims and payouts for medical
malpractice claims. 134 Utilizing technology to adopt a risk management strategy
could target these bad actors and thus ultimately reduce malpractice and
physician misconduct.
Just as “the advance of computer technology and the creation of the National
Practitioner Data Bank allowed boards to better coordinate oversight efforts
among the states and . . . led to a significant increase in the number of serious
disciplinary actions . . . in the late 1980s and early 1990s,” 135 medical boards
today can utilize technology to improve regulatory processes. Technology can
be used to consolidate and share information almost instantaneously, utilize
133. U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS, supra note 128, at 10.
134. David A. Hyman et al., Medical Malpractice and Physician Discipline: The Good, The
Bad and The Ugly, 18 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 131, 131, 138–40 (2021).
135. Ross D. Silverman, State Medical Boards and the Politics of Public Protection, 21 J.
LEGAL MED. 143, 145 (2000).
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artificial intelligence and algorithmic solutions to assess risk, and thus continue
to improve physician accountability. Data interoperability is critical if medical
boards are to distill insight from regulatory output data and then reuse it for
systemic improvements and prevention of harm. Just as other industries have
applied data and machine learning to profoundly evolve historically limiting
business practices and derive greater impact, 136 so too should regulatory bodies
concerned with preventing and disciplining physician sexual misconduct.
A.

Improvements to Board Action Language

Standardization of disciplinary data and improved data sharing across the
health care and regulatory ecosystem brings with it the promise that medical
boards can utilize artificial intelligence strategically and improve their ability to
address all forms of physician misconduct—not just for sexual misconduct.
Properly labeled data sets are an essential component of this effort, 137 and one
which will be difficult to achieve because many of the databases were not
designed to interoperate. But once this occurs, medical boards would be able to
use this data to uncover patterns of concerning and unreported behavior,
intervene proactively to prevent harm, and engage in remedial and educational
efforts, where appropriate.
The FSMB is in a unique position to analyze and assist in the standardization
of disciplinary orders. Today, information is disseminated electronically through
FSMB’s Physician Data Center (PDC). 138 The PDC receives copies of 8000
disciplinary actions (on more than 4000 physicians) each year. 139 Medical
boards also query the FSMB more than 100,000 times and receive nearly 15,000
disciplinary alerts annually. 140
The full value of a centralized repository of disciplinary actions has not been
fully realized. One major constraint is that the actions the FSMB receives are as
varied as the boards themselves, and there is no standard manner in the
presentation of factual background and legal conclusions. To address this
dissonance, after the FSMB receives a copy of a disciplinary action, its PDC
staff reviews the order to discern the action(s) taken by the board and the
reason(s) for those action(s). While final determination generally comes from
the “findings of fact” and/or “conclusions of law,” the reasons for those actions
(based solely on the findings of fact), can be indistinct. In some cases, the basis
for discipline can only be categorized in general terms such as “unprofessional

136. THOMAS M. SEIBEL, DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION: SURVIVE AND THRIVE IN AN ERA OF
MASS EXTINCTION 75–82 (Eric Marti ed., 2019).
137. MELANIE MITCHELL, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A GUIDE FOR THINKING HUMANS 111
(1st ed. 2019).
138. U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS, supra note 128, at 8, 18.
139. Id. at 19.
140. Id. at 18.
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conduct” or the order is so opaque that the reason for discipline must be labeled
“not provided,” or “undetermined.” 141
In 2018, recognizing the need for reform and consistency in reporting, the
FSMB established an internal Workgroup to conduct a more detailed review of
disciplinary actions with focus on the narrative section. Initial analysis revealed:
(1) documents received from boards vary in quality and detail which creates
coding challenges, particularly in the case of reciprocal actions (e.g., some
boards do not provide documentation supporting the reciprocal actions); (2) the
way basis codes are assigned can sometimes create redundancies (e.g., alcohol
abuse, inappropriate use of alcohol, intemperate use of alcohol); (3) sometimes
codes can be derived from the findings of fact (e.g., moral unfitness), but provide
little insight into what happened (e.g., excessive prescribing); and (4) often there
is meaningful information beyond the findings of fact in the narrative contained
in the disciplinary action or in the instance of reciprocal action, in the original
disciplinary action.
In 2019, the FSMB’s PDC established a new process for coding a secondary
set of research basis codes based on the findings of fact and board order
narrative. In addition to coding the standard board action and basis code data,
the PDC reviewed—through both manual and machine learning techniques—
board orders with 5096 actions for 2575 physicians to determine if additional
research basis codes could be added. A preliminary analysis of this data revealed
that 554 orders were identified and coded with additional research basis codes,
providing greater insight into the facts behind disciplinary actions. Though less
common, meaningful increases in rates were also observed in physician-patient
boundary issues (eight orders added), sexual misconduct (sixteen added), and
sexual boundary issues (nine added).
The 2020 FSMB Report encourages medical boards and others to implement
clear coding processes for board actions that provide accurate descriptions of
cases, and clearly link licensee behaviors to disciplinary actions; where sexual
misconduct has occurred, the case should be labeled as such. 142 A label of
“disruptive physician behavior” or even “boundary violation” is less helpful than
the more specific label of “sexual misconduct.” 143 In furtherance of this goal,
the FSMB has joined with the NPDB and other stakeholders in the house of
medicine to develop consistent terminology that allows a violation and the
underlying causes of discipline to be stated explicitly, thereby promoting greater
understanding for the public and the medical boards, while also enabling the
tracking of trends, frequencies, recidivism, and the impact of remedial measures.

141. See generally King et al., supra note 4, at 1609–10.
142. Report and Recommendations of the FSMB Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct,
supra note 11, at 28.
143. Id.
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B.

Greater Use of Technology in the Regulatory Process and Risk-Based
Transformation

Efforts to utilize advanced data analytics in the regulatory process are
increasing. The North Carolina Medical Board, through improvements to its
Safe Opioid Prescribing Initiative, effectuated greater use of data analytics to
proactively screen and identify prescribers of interest where no complaint has
been received. 144 Internationally, the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation
Agency is developing and has already piloted new risk-based approaches to
managing complaints against health practitioners, including a risk-assessment
tool that cross references complaint data against known features of a practitioner
and the circumstances of their practice in order to allocate regulatory resources
more quickly and effectively. 145 These efforts are evidence that regulators are
diligent in their efforts to fulfill their statutory mandates.
This shift on the part of medical boards to utilize technology for automated
regulatory and administrative decision making systems is a dramatic shift from
the status quo that will no doubt raise concerns that boards would be out of
compliance with due process and other legal requirements. 146 Proponents of
integrating artificial intelligence into the toolbox used by regulators argue that
existing legal doctrines need not create insuperable barriers to governmental use
of machine learning so long as the operational frameworks behind them are
understandable. 147 Critics may also cite that the data necessary to train the
systems may exacerbate human biases, or pose problematic considerations
related to privacy, data usage, and government accountability. But these issues
have coexisted with artificial intelligence from the outset. And while these
questions may not be easily answered, recognition of the issues and collaborative
efforts to address them during the deployment of technology-enabled regulatory
solutions allows the benefits to be realized and the promise of improved
regulation to be embraced. 148

144. In 2017, the North Carolina Medical Board sought legislative changes that would allow it
to access data on patient and prescriber characteristics to improve assessment of behaviors
commonly associated with inappropriate opioid prescribing and to identify additional licensees for
investigation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(b2) (2019).
145. AUSTRALIAN HEALTH PRAC. REGUL. AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 2017/18:
NOTIFICATIONS AND MONITORING (2018), http://www.ahpra.gov.au/annualreport/2018/notifica
tions.html.
146. CARY COGLIANESE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENTAL USE OF MACHINE LEARNING
(2020) (report to the Admin. Conf. of the U.S.).
147. Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in
the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1176, 1222 (2017).
148. See ADMIN. CONF. OF U.S., STATEMENT #20, AGENCY USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
(2020), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Statement%2020%20Agency%20Use
%20of%20Artificial%20Intelligence.pdf (discussing the possible application of AI to aggregated
data on professional conduct).
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Properly implemented, a risk-based approach to regulation can improve
allocation of scarce regulatory resources, identify physicians that need
additional support and in doing so, avert misconduct before it occurs, and
ultimately improve the protection of the public and its trust of the system as a
whole.
VI CONCLUSION
Sexual misconduct in medicine is a critical problem that requires innovative
solutions and sustained attention from medical boards. However, sexual
misconduct relates fundamentally to the prevailing culture within the profession
of medicine and in health care generally. Overcoming the most significant
challenges to addressing it will therefore only be possible with support from all
stakeholders within the health care system and must involve an ongoing
reexamination of the nature of medical professionalism, including the duties
held towards patients and colleagues. All stakeholders play a role in addressing
physician sexual misconduct, and it is imperative that the culture around
reporting physician misconduct shifts. Practitioners and health care institutions
must understand the role that they play in perpetuating this problem by their
silence; their failure to report makes it impossible for medical boards to act.
From the clinic to the boardroom, moving forward, there must be greater
accountability for institutional failure to report.
Medical board responses to physician sexual misconduct must be evaluated
in light of their historical context, statutory constraints, and structural
limitations. While some critiques of medical boards fail to consider these
cultural features and discount the positive incremental changes that boards have
made, this does not in any way diminish the need for boards to continue to make
progress. Innovative solutions, such as utilizing technology to supplement the
complaint-based system and to develop risk-focused strategies, are possible.
Contextualizing medical board responses can help boards, legislators, and other
stakeholders think critically about the physician sexual misconduct problem and
craft solutions that will effectuate change.
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